I recently stumbled on the fact that eight states, mostly in the Midwest, defaulted on their state bonds in the 1840s. Okay, that may not seem too exciting, but when I learned about it, I also discovered a realm of American history I had not come across before: “canal mania.”
Many of those states had spent a lot of money on canals, much of it borrowed money (bonds rather than taxes), which ultimately they could not pay back. Other problems also plagued these states such as investments in railroads and banks, but canals were big.
Most of these canal ventures were kicked off by one success—the amazing Erie Canal, which opened in 1825. A few canals had been built in the East before that, such as the 27-mile canal between the Merrimack River and Boston. But the Erie Canal ran from Albany, New York, across the state to Buffalo: 363 miles. The canal required 83 locks.
The Misleading Success of the Erie Canal
The undertaking was Herculean, and few people expected it to succeed. For years after New York governor Dewitt Clinton endorsed the project and supplied state funds, it was called “Clinton’s Ditch.” President Thomas Jefferson had refused to provide federal aid, saying to do so would be “little short of madness.” (He also thought such support would violate the U. S. Constitution.) [1]
But the canal, 40 feet wide and 4 feet deep, whose boats were pulled by horses on a towpath, did open to much fanfare in 1825, and within eight years its capital cost had been paid off.
That was the first and last spectacular canal success story.
In fact, we often get a picture of the canals as utter failures. Historian Alvin Harlow (in 1927) called Indiana’s Wabash and Erie Canal the “most colossal, the most tragic failure in all canal history.”[2] Pennsylvania’s chief canal was a “technological monstrosity, a canal across mountains,” said Julius Rubin.”[3] The Illinois and Michigan canal was a “financial disaster”according to a history textbook. [4] Roger L. Ransom concluded that only five out of 19 government-supported canals were “probably successful.”[5]
Midwestern canal builders, hoping to copy the Erie Canal, ran into technical problems, financial problems, and political problems—and probably served locations that couldn’t justify the cost.
After the railroad appeared in the mid-1840s, most of the canals started losing revenue and eventually stopped operating. Today, canals are the object of, at best, antiquarian or touristic interest. (See photo above of the C&O Canal in Georgetown, Washington, D. C.)
But Wait!
Yes, there’s more to the story. The combination of canals, rivers, and lakes—especially after Robert Fulton constructed a viable steamboat in 1817—helped expand much of Midwest agriculture by providing access to distant markets. The railroad modified but did not reverse those changes.
In fact, economist Robert W. Fogel became a champion of canals. Fogel won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993, but in 1964 he published what was essentially his PhD thesis, a book called Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric Theory. [6]
Fogel observed that historians (like earlier railroad boosters) have assumed that the railroad was “indispensable” to American growth. Respected historian August C. Bolino, for example, said the railroad “provided a transportation service which was essential to the development of capitalism in America.” [7]
Not so fast, said Fogel. He argued that if there had been no railroad, the country’s economic development would have suffered very little. Why?
Steamboats and wagons were in operation, aided by the canal packet boats. The canals could have been expanded. Over time canal engineers would have developed better technology—just as railroad engineers did. The internal combustion engine might have come much earlier, making motor trucking possible, especially if money was spent on improving roads rather than building railroads.
Fogel’s econometric studies led him to conclude that “the combination of wagon and water transportation could have provided a relatively good substitute for the fabled iron horse.” [8]
Fogel’s work is still controversial, but historian William Cronon also supports the importance of canals. In his book Nature’s Metropolis, historian Cronon explained that waterways set the stage for Chicago’s Midwest dominance well before the railroads did. [9]
Largely because of the Erie Canal, New York City was connected to the Midwest by water routes early in the century. That connection (which more-southern cities like St. Louis and Louisville did not have) favored Chicago, giving the city on Lake Michigan a market for farm crops and a source of manufactured goods. The other cities, while on rivers, did not have such easy access to the biggest market in the country. Later, the Illinois and Michigan Canal dramatically increased Chicago’s access to farms in the Midwest.
So when Chicago adopted the railroad, it was already well ahead on the route to economic prosperity, thanks to waterways.
Notes
[1] Norfolk Towne Assembly, “Canals—A Tool for Economic Growth in the Early Republic,” February 18, 2022, https://www.norfolktowneassembly.org/post/canals-a-tool-for-economic-growth-in-the-early-republic.
[2] Quoted by Ronald E. Shaw, “Canals in the Early Republic: A Review of Recent Literature,” Journal of the Early Republic 4, no. 2 (Summer 1984): 117–142, at 131.
[3] Quoted by Shaw, 131.
[4] Lance Davis et al., quoted in Shaw, 131.
[5] Quoted in Shaw, 130.
[6] Robert W. Fogel, Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric Theory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964).
[7] Quoted in Fogel, 9.
[8] Fogel, 219.
[9] William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991).
Image above is of the C & O Canal in Washington D.C.’s Georgetown, taken by Ken Lund and licensed by Creative Commons.
This is an excellent essay, and Rob Natelson’s comment is a bonus.
Here in NE Wisconsin, Diane and I have kayaked the length of the Fox River from Lake Winnebago (Fond du Lac at its southern tip) to Lake Michigan (Green Bay), not in all one day mind you, a trip of some 45 miles made possible by a series of locks built at dams to allow barges and boats to navigate the rapid descent. The lock and dam system made it possible for cities such as Appleton and Green Bay to become thriving commercial hubs, using hydropower to grind flour and then make paper, and moving agricultural products and paper from the Wisconsin countryside south to Milwaukee and then Chicago, and north to the Great Lakes and then to population centers in the east.
The locks were made obsolete, we are told, within a couple years of their completion by the arrival of trains, similar to the canals you describe. They fell into disrepair and today are operated primarily as a recreation and tourist attraction. Train tracks often appear close to the river’s banks, probably because this right-of-way was most easily obtained, often occupying the very space that horses would have used to pull barges along the short canals separating the locks from the main river.
Those train tracks are now being abandoned, due to reduced use of coal (due to deindustrialization, electrification, and the abundance of natural gas) and the movement of the paper industry to southern states (to be closer to tree plantations planted specifically for the pulp industry and lower labor costs) as well as competition from trucks and possibly NIMBY opposition to their noise and impact on local traffic. They are being torn up to make way for residential development, including the recently constructed apartment building where I now dwell.
It is fascinating to imagine what could have been, had railroads and then highways not been subsidized at the expense of canals and locks.
Joe: It sounds scary to go up and down on locks in kayaks! But you two made it.
I want to respond to your comment: “It is fascinating to imagine what could have been, had railroads and then highways not been subsidized at the expense of canals and locks.”
There is much to be explored here. Initially, railroads were financed in much the same ways as canals—private companies sometimes supported by state money. It was really after the Civil War that the grandiose plans to create transcontinental railroads led to national subsidies and waste and corruption. I’ve been reading Randal O”Toole’s Romance of the Rails, which illustrates this point. I need to learn more, though.
Jane, that’s a terrific piece. I’m going to dig deeper (pardon the pun).
The 1840s infrastructure mania had an effect on state constitutions as well. Specifically, drafters of state constitutions in the latter part of the 19th century included fiscal limitations and anti-corruption rules to prevent future bankruptcies and defaults. These included balanced budget requirements, limits on debt, bans or regulations on certain kinds of contracts, competitive bidding requirements, and required referenda for certain fiscal actions, such as incurring debt or taxes over a set amount.
In ensuing years, state policy makers, with the connivance of the courts, weakened the force of such restrictions. By the 1990s, for example, the fiscal restrictions in Colorado’s 1876 constitution had been virtually erased by judicial fiat. The voters inserted a replacement amendment by voter initiative in 1992, but it has gone through a similar judicial erosion process.
The fiscal restrictions in Montana’s 1889 constitution were attacked in a different way: In 1972, liberal interests ran a PR campaign (largely funded with taxpayer dollars) to get the voters to approve a new constitution that abolished most the fiscal and anti-corruption restraints. One immediate result was a tax and spending spree that almost destroyed the Montana economy.
Fascinating! Such restrictions (according to Walter Thurman and Eric Edwards) led to the creation of agricultural drainage districts and other special-purpose districts.