What Should We Do about “Mad” Anthony’s Forest?

Wayne National forest named after "Mad" Anthony Wayne

The U.S. Forest Service has proposed renaming Wayne National Forest, a 240,000-acre forest in southeast Ohio. It has selected the name Buckeye National Forest. (Ohio is the Buckeye State.)

The forest honors Anthony Wayne, an important general in the American Revolution. But “Mad” Anthony (whose label was given for disputed reasons)  also was a key figure in the Northwest Indian War, ousting Native Americans from much of Ohio. Understandably, American Indian tribes are encouraging the name change.

I have been opposed to the removal of statues for the sake of “woke” ideology. I’m also doubtful about renaming southern forts, even though they were named for mediocre Confederate generals in order to perpetuate Jim Crow (see this post). And I think renaming college buildings is mostly silly. Which North Carolina State college student wonders about the namesake of Daniels Hall—now labeled 111 Lampe Drive?

But let’s think about the Anthony Wayne National Forest. Continue reading “What Should We Do about “Mad” Anthony’s Forest?”

Silencing the Past: From the Haitian Revolution to American Correspondence Schools

Drawing or etching of the Haitian Revolution

We’ve all heard that history is written by the winners.  In his 1995 book, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History,  Michel-Rolph Trouillot both agrees and disagrees. He shows that  historical narratives, such as the story of the Haitian Revolution,  reflect differences in  power—”the uneven contribution of competing groups and individuals,” from the initial event to the written word.[1]

In other words, the people who shape history are not necessarily the winners. But they usually have some kind of power.

About a third of the way through his book I realized that I had discovered  such silences in my research on, yes, American correspondence schools. Continue reading “Silencing the Past: From the Haitian Revolution to American Correspondence Schools”

Relearning the Lessons of Vietnam

Vietnam decision-makers Dean Rusk, President Johnson, Robert McNamara

I was in college in the spring of 1965, when President Lyndon B. Johnson announced he was sending combat troops—two Marine battalions—to South Vietnam. Thus, my professional life began in the decade of public debate, turmoil, and tragedy surrounding Vietnam.

What I didn’t know (among many other things, of course) was that the announcement of combat troops was disingenuous, one in a long line of disingenuous public statements from the president and his close associates. U.S. “advisers” had been quietly taking part in combat missions since 1961.[1]

Nor did I know that the seemingly sudden “Americanization” of a previously foreign war had been years in the making. Arch T. Allen, a retired attorney, brought this to my attention recently in a paper he wrote about the war. [2]

The Vietnam War, Allen points out, was managed behind a veil of duplicity. I suspected that in 1965, and the fact was confirmed in 1971, when the Pentagon Papers were leaked to major newspapers.

But I never knew how deep that duplicity ran. Continue reading “Relearning the Lessons of Vietnam”

What Does the Vietnam War Have to Do with the U.S. Civil War?

Vietnam Veterans' Memorial

Did the “Vietnam syndrome” affect how historians viewed the U.S. Civil War? Here’s an argument that it did.

But first, recognize that historians have mixed feelings about the present. On the one hand, today’s issues can shed light on the past because “each generation asks a different set of questions.”[1] On the other, they can lead to presentism—reshaping the past by imposing today’s viewpoints.

I’m always on the lookout for such interplays. And that may have happened with the post-Vietnam era.  I just learned that in 2002 the prominent Civil War historian Brian Holden Reid argued that the Vietnam War reshaped historians’ understanding of the American Civil War. [2] Reid’s article appeared in the journal of a British military-security think tank.

Of course, thousands of pages—thousands of books, perhaps—have been written trying to explain why the North won and the South lost. A major trope used to be that the North initially failed to win because it lacked bold generals willing to take their troops into battle—until Ulysses S. Grant was appointed commanding general.

A New Interpretation

Reid suggests that after the Vietnam War, Civil War history became more about why the South lost—by failing to take a more defensive strategy—and why, in historians’ view,  big battles were futile. Continue reading “What Does the Vietnam War Have to Do with the U.S. Civil War?”

The Futility of Congressional Investigations

Congressional Inquiry into the Attack on Pearl Harbor

Congressional hearings are moving into high gear these days. Republicans have a lot of issues about which they want “transparency” and “truth and accountability”; they intend to “pursue the facts no matter where they take us”;  they seek to “investigate the investigators,” etc., etc.

I’m skeptical. Not that they won’t find out what happened—they may well do that—but whether it makes any difference depends on politics. If the politics are with them they will have an impact; if not, they won’t.

I’m going to illustrate my point by sharing the history of a massive congressional investigation that took place 78 years ago. It was a whopper. The investigation went on for six and a half months and the testimony took up 39 volumes. So what happened? The majority party signed the report; the minority party dissented. Nothing much changed, except for the lives of some who were barred or discouraged from testifying and the cryptologist who bore the mental scars of trying to get the facts out for the rest of his life—and undoubtedly some others I don’t know about.

The investigation was the 1945 congressional inquiry into the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941. Continue reading “The Futility of Congressional Investigations”