Congressional hearings are moving into high gear these days. Republicans have a lot of issues about which they want “transparency” and “truth and accountability”; they intend to “pursue the facts no matter where they take us”; they seek to “investigate the investigators,” etc., etc.
I’m skeptical. Not that they won’t find out what happened—they may well do that—but whether it makes any difference depends on politics. If the politics are with them they will have an impact; if not, they won’t.
I’m going to illustrate my point by sharing the history of a massive congressional investigation that took place 78 years ago. It was a whopper. The investigation went on for six and a half months and the testimony took up 39 volumes. So what happened? The majority party signed the report; the minority party dissented. Nothing much changed, except for the lives of some who were barred or discouraged from testifying and the cryptologist who bore the mental scars of trying to get the facts out for the rest of his life—and undoubtedly some others I don’t know about.
The investigation was the 1945 congressional inquiry into the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941.
The Pearl Harbor Investigation
My personal views about the strike on Pearl Harbor and “who knew what when” can be found here and (in more detail) here. But in this post I’m writing mostly about the findings in a gripping book, Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy, by Percy Greaves.
In 1945, the 39-year-old Greaves was hired by Senator Owen Brewster (R-Maine) to assist the Republicans in the joint congressional investigative committee of Pearl Harbor, which aimed to find out why the U.S. Army and Navy in Hawaii had been so unprepared. Greaves’ job was to research previous studies of the Pearl Harbor attack, recommend witnesses, take notes, and prompt congressmen during the hearings. He probably knew as much as anyone in the world about the joint committee’s investigation. After the hearings, disappointed, he began writing a book.
Greaves’ book was unfinished when he died in 1984. Later his widow, Bettina Bien Greaves, edited the original, and the 937-page book was at last published by the Mises Institute in 2010.
The Joint Congressional Committee on Pearl Harbor
The attack on the U.S. fleet in Hawaii was so shocking that during the war there were numerous reports on it, most of them secret. The public one was by the (Owen J.) Roberts Commission. It accused Walter C. Short, commanding general of the army in Hawaii, and Husband Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the U. S. fleet, both based in Hawaii at the time of the attack, of being derelict in their duties. Both were pressured to retire and were warned of possible disciplinary action in the future.
But at the end of the war (Aug. 29, 1945) President Truman made public two important reports—the Army’s and the Navy’s. Both raised questions about the fairness of condemning Short and Kimmel while ignoring the role of higher-level Washington figures. The release raised enough public outcry that Republicans pushed for an investigation.
The joint congressional committee began its hearing in November 1945 with six Democrats and four Republicans. The goal, said Senate majority leader Alben Barkley, was to make the inquiry “without partisanship or favoritism.” But as Greaves wrote, “the congressional committee was soon embroiled in politics.” [1]
The nature of such a hearing—day-after-day testimony from 44 witnesses, the political conflicts among the questioners, the contradictions and often fuzzy memory among witnesses—can obfuscate more than enlighten. To illustrate, I’ll select two people who testified and one who didn’t.
George Marshall, Army Chief of Staff
The most puzzling part of the testimony of this much-admired figure, was what he was doing on Dec. 6 and Dec. 7. Diplomatic negotiations with Japan had broken down by Nov. 27 and his subordinates had sent a message to important commanders that war was imminent—although he and others in Washington did not indicate to anyone that Pearl Harbor might be a target.
On the witness stand, Marshall said that he could not remember where he was on Dec. 6, the night before the attack, but “the probability is . . . we were home.” [2] (Other evidence suggests that he was at a top-level meeting with the president.) That afternoon, a lengthy 13-part Japanese message had been decoded and, according to another witness, General Sherman Miles of the Army’s Intelligence Division, it was delivered to Marshall that day. It listed in detail the failures of negotiations with the U.S. and referred to an upcoming message that would be presented to the U.S. Secretary of State at 1 pm Sunday.
Marshall denied having seen the report until Sunday, the day of the attack.
On Sunday morning Army courier Colonel Rufus S. Bratton tried to reach Marshall around 9 am because the 14th part of the message, and the ”One p.m. message” had been decoded. (One p.m. would be 7:30 am in Hawaii.) But Marshall was “out riding” and no one could find him. Marshall did call Bratton about 10 am and it took him till 11:25 am to arrive at the War Dept. Then he read and reread the message and finally sent a warning to commanders in the Pacific.
Before the warning reached Hawaii, Marshall received news of the attack.
So, four years later, in December 1945, Marshall told the committee that he couldn’t remember whether he was at home or at the War Department when he learned about the attack. Percy Greaves was amazed at that statement because “almost everyone [else] remembers vividly precisely where they were when they heard the news.”[3]
Laurance F. Safford
Captain Laurance F. Safford was head of the security section of the Navy’s communications intelligence unit. A brilliant cryptologist who is credited with important decoding successes, in November and December 1941 he was sending decoded Japanese diplomatic messages to Washington military leaders. One of those was critically important—it was called the “Winds Code,” a message picked up on November 19. It alerted Japanese diplomats to watch for a message (buried in a seemingly normal weather report) that would indicate whether Japan was going to war. “East wind” would mean a breakup of relations with the United States and, presumably, war.
On December 4, Safford received a message with the words “East wind.” He sent the message to the top Washington figures and assumed that this (like his earlier messages) would be forwarded to Short and Kimmel. But they were not—nor had earlier messages been sent.
After the attack, Safford, like others, privately condemned the Hawaii commanders for not being ready for an attack. But during the war (while preparing for an anticipated postwar inquiry) he discovered that his messages had never been sent to Short or Kimmel. He was shocked.
And then, in 1943, Stafford discovered that the “Winds Execute” message—the one indicating that war was imminent with the U.S.—was no longer in his files, or in any files he could find.
Troubled, he tried to find the people who might remember the message and came across Chief Warrant Officer Ralph T. Briggs, stationed in Cheltenham, Maryland. Yes, Briggs had seen such a message, and knew it had been forwarded to Safford. This renewed Safford’s confidence.
Partly through luck, in 1944 Safford found that there was a collection of messages, including “Wind Execute,” that “must have been tossed in a safety box and forgotten.” [4] Safford was able to use that neglected collection of messages to corroborate his testimony when the time came. But the evidence provided little help for his larger story—that the Hawaiian commanders had not been warned.
Ralph T. Briggs
A bit player in this drama, Ralph Briggs enabled Stafford to argue for the existence of the Winds Execute message. What is known about Briggs comes mostly from an interview that Bettina Bien Greaves conducted with him in 1988. That is because Briggs never testified before the Joint Congressional Committee about the “Winds Execute” message, in spite of his willingness to do so.
As indicated above, Briggs confirmed its existence to Safford. He also told Safford he would be willing to testify about it. But not long after, the commanding officer of the Naval security section where Briggs worked confronted him. According to Briggs, Captain John S. Harper said, “You are not to testify. I can’t give you the reasons at this time, but some day you’ll understand why.”[5] Briggs did not testify, and he was not alone.
Conclusion
These are just a few tiny strands of an enormously complicated and dense ball of thread. But they do not build conviction for the integrity of congressional investigations.
It is possible that other investigations may have had a significant and beneficial impact (the Army-McCarthy hearings come to mind). But it’s all about politics. If you confidently think congressional investigations are going to change things because they reveal “truth,” think again.
This image of the attack on Pearl Harbor is from the National Archives and is in the public domain.
Notes
[1] Percy Greaves, Pearl Harbor: The Seeds and Fruits of Infamy, edited by Bettina Bien Greaves (Auburn ALA: Mises Institute, 2010), 620, 621.
[2] Greaves 636.
[3] Greaves, 640.
[4] Greaves, 436.
[5] Greaves, 675.
Very eye opening. Thank you for sharing!!
Also… There’s a very different line of critical investigation of American failure at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere. William Bradford Huie’s 1946 book “The Case Against the Admirals” documents how Navy leadership intentionally sabotaged the development of American airpower in the interest of inter service rivalry and promoting the obsolete battleship. This, plus his 1942 “The Fight for Air Power” make the case; they are worth reading.
He doesn’t cover this, but later interservice rivalries threatened to block foundation of the USAF; it might also be affecting mission of US Space Force. The problem of military bureaucracies sacrificing defense of the nation in favor of defense of their turf is a serious problem.
Huie was apparently a protege of Mencken and quite an interesting journalist in his own right.
Charles, I appreciate your bringing this up. I guess that explains why we have a “Joint Chiefs of Staff.” (Just read that the Joint Chiefs was officially organized in 1949 although it had existed informally during World War II. Then it was reauthorized and strengthened in 1986.) Being chairman might be a very difficult task.
Jane, Thanks for another excellent article. For me, the trick is to see through the politics and see some glimmer of the truth.
A quote from “The High Tide of American Conservatism” (p. 265) about John W Davis and the Pecora congressional hearings in 1934:
“From his own days in Congress, Davis had developed a deep cynicism regarding congressional hearings. He believed Congress was full of politicians who ‘prayed regularly, “Lord, let the limelight shine on me, just for the day.”’ And he viewed Pecora’s committee from this deeply skeptical perspective.”
Davis’ thoughts are still applicable today!
“Lord, let the limelight shine on me.” Heh! This might well be the opening prayer for each session of Congress!
Jane, this is a penetrating and informative article, thanks for digging into and sharing this.
Not much has changed, obviously, since this investigation. Maybe your title could be shortened to “The Futility of Congress”.
This is indeed a fascinating story. After Bettina Greaves’ book was published, I reviewed it for the Foundation for Economic Education. One person who read it and responded was the grandson of Admiral Kimmel, who was and probably still is trying to set the record straight with regard to this disaster. The way the military and FDR made scapegoats out of Kimmel and Short was, one might say, infamous.