The American public recently watched a surprising event: After months of saying that he would stay in the presidential race, Joe Biden dropped out. What interested me most was the predictions that preceded it.
Some pundits were adamant that he would stay in; others, such as Bill Maher and Vivek Ramaswamy, were certain he wouldn’t. (I have had difficulty finding the words of those other than Donald Trump who said he would keep going. Maybe they know how to “bury negative search results” on Google.)
Biden’s decision led me to think about whether events in history were predictable. Could the following events have been predicted?
Ratification of the U.S. Constitution
Maybe. Nine states had to approve the Constitution for it to become law and replace the Articles of Confederation. Ratification was likely—but we tend to forget that there was a big fight over it.
As Jay Schalin wrote on these pages, history is not necessarily written by the winners, but by those “who can write best, even if they were the losers.” The supporters of the Constitution were both winners and good writers. The authors of The Federalist Papers were people who would soon have important posts in the new government: John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison. They wrote well, and often.
But why did they have to write all those essays? Because the AntiFederalists—people such as George Mason and Patrick Henry—were genuinely concerned about the power that the Constitution gave to the national government. George Mason, for example, wrote, “There is no declaration of any kind, for preserving the liberty of the press, or the trial by jury in civil cases; nor against the danger of standing armies in time of peace.”[1]
The debate brought us the Bill of Rights. We should be deeply grateful to the AntiFederalists.
The Civil War
I say yes. The issue was the expansion of slavery (not slavery itself, at first). The buildup was slow and it took a long time, but the conflict only increased and the positions hardened as time went on.
Simply considering acts of Congress, the process started with the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (which let Missouri into the Union as a slave state, and Maine as a free state). That led to the Compromise of 1850 (a complicated collection of actions that brought in California as a free state but strengthened the Fugitive Slave Act). Then in 1854, there was the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which set off a firestorm because it allowed Kansas to vote on whether it would be slave or free (no one was too concerned about slavery in Nebraska. )
The Dred Scott decision, John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry, and the election of Lincoln quickly followed. After the firing on Fort Sumter, Lincoln asked for 75,000 volunteers to quell the southern rebellion. That caused the remaining Southern states to secede—and allowed southerners to name the conflict “The War of Northern Aggression.”
The ultimate conflict seems inevitable. The only thing that might have prevented it would have been paying enslavers to free their slaves, as Great Britain did in the Caribbean. This seems impossible in the nineteenth-century United States.
World War I
Surely not! No one expected the horrific lengthy war that occurred, with 16.5 million people killed, and the seeds of anger planted for another world war 20 years later. [2] Retrospectively, we can see how the alliances had been set up to create a perfect storm. But in 1914, a global war must have seemed unlikely. There had already been two Balkan Wars (in two years—1912–1913), one of which ended the Ottoman Empire. Wouldn’t another war be like those? Troublesome for Europeans, but contained.
And when the war did start, everyone expected it to be a quick one. It might have been, if either France or Germany had decisively won the First Battle of the Marne in 1914. The French “victory” led the French to keep fighting. There were between 400,000 and 500,000 casualties (dead and wounded) in that one battle. [3]That should have been sacrifice enough to the gods of war.
Other Predictions
What about other dramatic events? The American Revolution—was it predictable? Think of how hard the Massachusetts firebrands had to work to bring it about. And if it weren’t for Patrick Henry and Thomas Paine they might not have succeeded.
What about the civil rights movement in the United States? The end of apartheid in South Africa? The Reformation?
I welcome your thoughts (and essays)!
Notes (Comments follow the notes).
[1] George Mason, Objections to This Form of Government, September 1787, https://www.archives.gov/files/legislative/resources/education/bill-of-rights/images/mason.pdf.
[2] Death estimates vary, but this seems to be the consensus. See Patrick J. Kiger, “How Many People Died in World War I?” History.com, May 20, 2024. https://www.history.com/news/how-many-people-died-in-world-war-i.
[3] Kennedy Hickman, “World War I: First Battle of the Marne.” ThoughtCo., https://www.thoughtco.com/first-battle-of-the-marne-2361397.
In any dynamic and complex system we can see direction but not destiny. We can measure forces but we cannot predict the finish. Diplomats and scholars predicted that the West’s growing support for Ukraine to enter the ECU and NATO would cause a Russian invasion, but did even one predict Ukraine would invade Russia?
As someone opined, we can predict the past much better than the future. Or we can connect the dots after an event but seldom before.
With trepidation I suggest that the proper way to think about predicting human history is to use the model of quantum physics–probability, not prediction. In both the universe and human history, we are dealing with a lot of dark matter and energy.
Some great thoughts, Wallace! Thank you.
I’m embarrassed to say that I wasn’t aware that experts were predicting a Russian invasion of Ukraine. If so, why didn’t they do something about it!? Your statement gives credibility to those who defend Russia (in a way) because Putin saw danger to Russia’s position in world politics. The situation (from the Russian perspective) has only gotten worse with the addition of Sweden and Finland.
It was common knowledge that Russia regarded NATO expansion and meddling in Ukraine as a direct threat. Putin was screaming about it at the top of his lungs and threatening reprisal. However, those atop the US foreign policy establishment very likely wanted a third-party war with Russia, since many in control of our foreign policy are stuck in a Cold War mindset that hasn’t reflected reality since 1990. They were essentially “predicting the past” by attempting to mire Russia in an endless, expensive conflict with Ukraine—similarly to Vietnam (US) and Afghanistan (USSR). It was hoped that such a quagmire would disrupt Russia’s internal politics and topple Putin, rendering Russia weak and non-threatening.
Many in the West prefer a return to the pre-Putin era of the 1990s when Russia’s economy was in a freefall, and its vast resources were being sold off at fire-sale prices. After the 2022 invasion, Russia survived Western sanctions, but the destruction of the Nord Stream pipelines has indeed hurt the Russian economy—although not as badly as it hurt Germany, the pipeline’s primary customer. The Ukraine war highlights how being a U.S. ally can have disastrous results, since it has devastated Ukraine, killing hundreds of thousands, depopulating large areas, and destroying its productive potential.
Ukraine’s recent attack on Russia, though unexpected, was not entirely unpredictable. Ukraine’s war situation is dire; it needed to do something different. The Kursk offensive appears to be a desperate last-ditch attempt to garner favorable propaganda and financial support from Ukraine’s weary allies. It was just a few thousand troops—hardly a sustainable force to hold Russian territory. (Of course, the Western media has turned it into some great victory that might turn the tide of the war.)
Jay gives a good summary of why many predicted Putin’s invasion. And after all, he had already invaded in 2014. I might differ from Jay and some of those who blame the west for provoking Putin. Nationalism and such are Putin’s window dressing for legitimizing what has been for some time a mafia country and mentality.
Putin rose to power compliments of Yeltsin and his oligarchs who acquired the wealth production of Russia. As mafia boss in charge of a country, the oligarchs became his consiglieres. He ordered oblast (regions) heads to be appointed, not elected. Some holdouts like Svetkov in Magadan were assassinated. Ukraine had always been a subsidiary territory. When a mafia boss sees someone else taking one of his territories, he threatens and if the territory gets rid of his consigliere and does not pay tribute, he burns down the business. (Recall that Ukrainians, with a lot of would be mafiosos of its own, threw out the Russia friendly president.)
In hind sight the Kursk invasion will become predictable. Will it be successful in some way is unpredictable, as in “anybody’s guess . . . “
Wallace, I agree that Putin’s roots are mafioso. He came out of the St. Petersburg mob and has ruthlessly accumulated total power as president. Occasionally, one of his critics takes a dive out of an upper-floor high-rise window. However, it is possible to be two things at once. His patriotism appears to be genuine; if he were purely a gangster, he would have continued to allow the oligarchs and foreigners to continue to pick Russia clean. Instead, Russia has rebounded under his rule. While perhaps It does not meet Western standards, it has been a fairly well run–and free–nation. The decline in life spans that occurred under Yeltsin has reversed, and there is considerable support for him among the people. Consider that today there are more people in England who have been jailed for criticizing the government than in Russia.
Putin is a very complex man–he appears to be both great and terrible at the same time. Like many previous Russian rulers.
Jay, I have several contacts in Russia who admittedly shape my opinion and how I interpret the news and data. They range from a retired colonel I met in arctic Russia to lawyers to scientists and doctors and pensioners. Not a “representative sample” or a good survey, but useful windows into life there.
Whether life has improved under Putin depends on who you are and where you are and what you value. Many who rely on pensions are as poor as ever. Those who could not leave the poor villages and towns of Siberia and the Far East are still stuck there without the old privileges (long vacations, double pay, almost free flights, etc). Inflation is heating up very noticeably. Population is decreasing.
Based on these contacts and what I read from a variety of sources, my view is 180 deg. different from, “if he were purely a gangster, he would have continued to allow the oligarchs and foreigners to continue to pick Russia clean. Instead, Russia has rebounded under his rule.”
His oligarchs, the survivors, have picked the country clean. He did force out foreign investors, at least those that were naive enough to think they could run a reasonably honest business. I do hear that the GAI (traffic police) are not nearly as insistent on bribes–a minor improvement akin to a successful mosquito spray program.
To hear Russia called a “free country” is almost shocking when there’s only government controlled media (not counting those who can use VOPN for internet). And “well run” perhaps in the sense that most tyrannies or dictatorships have predictable limits and narrow tolerance (freedom) for surprises.
“The event illuminates its own past; it can never be deduced from it.” Hannah Arendt
Jane,
Thank you for the walk down history lane in your post. Most of the events were unfortunate, but they are the ones that tend to garner the most attention.
Is history now predictable? In these days of widespread communication, social media channels and general “blather”, I’d venture to say that almost all events are predictable – or, better yet, feared.
The fears are shared on both sides of every issue. Some fear (and predict) a Trump election, others fear (and predict) a Harris presidency.
All out war between Iran and Israel? Same dynamic, same fears, same predictions. Just different sides, but it is safe to say that historians will be able to look back and safely say they were predicted.
Even weather disasters, usually not considered predictable, can enter this category undertake cover of climate change and the “predictions” of serious (but not specific) calamities.
Good food for thought. I continue to be impressed by the comments of your other responders, who think about and express their ideas so lucidly.
Is “history” predictable? This is a really interesting and fundamental question.
Economics is the science of human decision making and action, the stuff that becomes the material of history. Economics can make *conditional* predictions of the sort “if A, then B.” For example, an increase in the minimum wage for unskilled labor will lead to an increase in unemployment, *if* demand and supply for such labor remain constant. The prediction of increased unemployment is conditional on that, but predicting everything that might affect D & S would require predicting everything from human behavior in every other market, plus weather, plus the vagaries of politicians, etc. Hence the necessary and very sensible ceteris paribus qualification.
The amount of knowledge that would be required to consistently correctly predict history is an enormous and insurmountable barrier. There are too many unknown unknowns for even the most knowledgeable experts. AI and similar contemporary advances in computing have increased the number of variables and amount of data we can handle in making our conditional predictions, but these don’t overcome the problem of the unknown unknowns.
A second problem, emphasized by Menger and Mises, is that even when the fundamental factors determining historical outcomes are known, their relative strengths are not. E.g. suppose we know the minimum wage is about to be raised and also have a strong suspicion the demand for labor is about to increase for some reason. Which effect will have greater magnitude and dominate is still unknown. So too important this such as timing of a sequence of events. Hence the Austrians (and German Historicists as well) emphasized Verstehen (understanding or wise judgement) as a needed factor in doing history and other empirical work like predicting.
So no, history cannot truly be consistently, correctly predictable. Some predictions might be better grounded and more reasonable than others, but they are always guesses, educated or otherwise.
Charles, that’s an excellent analysis. It sounds as though accurate predictions are mostly luck!
Mr Steele, thank you for that excellent analysis. Written like a true economist. Regards.
I find the word “predictable” to be difficult. There is a difference between “able to be predicted” and “should have been predicted the by those responsible for doing so.” Biden’s decision to drop out of the race was predictable because it was, in fact, predicted by some. But was there enough evidence to render the prediction one that should have been made? I don’t know. (Also: Trump’s statement that Biden would hang on may have been political blather rather than one reflecting his considered judgment.)
On the compensated emancipation of slaves: I don’t think this was quite as inconceivable as Jane suggests. The idea had leading advocates, including Abraham Lincoln. Still, I agree it would not have happened: the Southern economic and cultural investment in slavery would have been very expensive to reimburse, and strong opposition to slavery in the North undermined the will to pay the price.
On World War I: I agree that both the war and the length of it could not have been readily predicted. On the other hand, I think the negative results of American intervention could, and should, have been, predicted by American leaders such as Woodrow Wilson. Our intervention produced a lopsided Allied victory that enabled those seeking revenge to humiliate the Axis powers. The immediate result was the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (a force for civilization), the elimination of any strong buffer in central Europe against the USSR, and a virulent resentment that promoted the Nazi cause.
Wilson was an academic with little political experience (2 years as NJ governor). He held the sort of ideas now common among academics: naive, fanciful, and basically hostile to American constitutionalism. It is not surprising he made the mistakes he did.
Rob, a great comment. I have a question about this: “Our intervention produced a lopsided Allied victory that enabled those seeking revenge to humiliate the Axis powers.” Keynes saw that in his “Economic Consequences of the Peace,” but why didn’t the principals?