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Toward a (Small) Theory of History

A library with books and statues.

Historians, both famed and anonymous, have developed theories that try to explain the course of history. The “Whig theory” of steady progress  was widely shared until the horrors of the twentieth century demolished it. Marx’s theory of one class replacing another had a long run. The “Great Man” theory (now, Great Person theory) still has some adherents.

I too am trying to develop a theory of history, but not a grandiose one. I’m trying to figure out if there are consistent ways to better understand certain historical outcomes. Why was St. Louis an “also-ran” to Chicago? Why did so many orphans work in the early factories of the Industrial Revolution? Was soil exhaustion a contributor to the Civil War?

In answering such questions, I borrow tools from my friends the economists. Economists don’t spend a lot of time digging into the past but when they do they come up with surprising findings. When Deirdre McCloskey explained the scattered private fields in medieval England, she solved a mystery that had stumped historians for decades, and  Eric Edwards and Walter Thurman just revealed an explanation for the U. S. Corn Belt that historians have largely ignored.

So let me see if a few basic economic tenets can expand our understanding. Here are three important ones (from the book Common Sense Economics).[1] Continue reading “Toward a (Small) Theory of History”

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Which Wars Should the U.S. Have Kept Out Of?

A scene from Vietnam in 1968, a "wrong war."

I would like to share with you a stunning essay from RealClearHistory.[1] By “stunning” I don’t mean it is absolutely correct but it is eye-opening. David Pyne lists the wars the U.S. shouldn’t have entered or supported—but did. These wrong wars start with the Spanish-American War in 1898 and end with today’s Ukraine-Russia war. As for the wars we should have fought, he bluntly explains how they were badly managed.

Pyne writes:

“A study of the outcome of major wars America has fought over the past 125 years strongly suggests that U.S. military involvement in these conflicts has resulted in tragic and unforeseen consequences leading to tens of millions of unnecessary deaths while also serving to create new, and, in some cases, much more powerful enemies, making the U.S. much less safe and secure in the process.”

This man is not a left-winger writing for The Nation or Mother Jones. He is deputy director of a nonprofit organization, EMP Task Force on National and Homeland Security.  EMP refers to electromagnetic pulses, which can be used to disrupt the electrical grid and possibly other critical infrastructure. The organization was initially authorized by Congress as an advisory board and works with conservative members of Congress.

Continue reading “Which Wars Should the U.S. Have Kept Out Of?”

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The Secret Behind the U. S. Corn Belt

Cornfield

It is a truism of American history:  The farmland of the Midwest was so rich that when the railroad and mechanical farm equipment arrived the region became the  breadbasket of the nation.

Yes, the “amazing fertility of the prairies” provides food for the entire country—and much of the world.[1]

However, it took more than railroads and the McCormick reaper.

In his book Nature’s Metropolis historian William Cronon hints at the problem facing a pioneering farmer in Missouri or Illinois in the early 19th century. “[The] flatness of the prairies subjected lowland areas to bad drainage and flooding.” An 1831 guide for newly-arrived farmers warned them to select their land carefully—flat land that looked good in the dry season could become a swamp when the rains came.[2]

In other words, what we romantically call wetlands (and often try to preserve) were the bane of the agricultural pioneer in the Midwest. “Farmers tried to settle far enough from floodplains and wet prairies to avoid bad drainage, but they also needed to be near enough to a stream course to obtain supplies of wood and water,” writes Cronon.  [3]

As long as there was a lot of land for sale, farmers could cope—often it “was cheaper to buy a new farm than to drain the farm one already owned,” one historian wrote in 1909. [4]

But it wasn’t until prairies could be efficiently drained of water that midwestern agriculture came into its own and the rich Corn Belt materialized. Continue reading “The Secret Behind the U. S. Corn Belt”

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Stalin and the Last Days of World War II

Stalin, Truman, and Churchill at Potsdam

When I began looking into the defeat of the Japanese in World War II, I was surprised to find so much written about the Soviet Union. Of course, the Soviet Union was a major factor in the war against the Germans—it lost more soldiers than any other country in the war.

But how important was the USSR in the Pacific? Quite important, as it turns out. The Soviet Union, the atomic bomb, and the potential invasion of Japan all were tightly entwined in the decisions made in the last days of the war.

This is my third and final post on the American decision to use the atom bomb. I’m not trying to judge the decision. As an educated layperson looking freshly at history, I just want to understand it.

In my first post I pointed out that President Truman knew nothing about the bomb until Franklin Roosevelt’s death in April 1945. The bomb was used less than four months later. Thus, it had enormous momentum and would have been difficult to stop. (Given how ill Roosevelt was, it is strange that he did not inform his vice president of such a major event; one historian calls this failure “disgraceful.”)[1]

In the second post I discussed whether the U. S. demand for unconditional surrender kept the Japanese from surrendering. This remains a genuine question. Had the Americans assured the Japanese that the emperor could remain in his position, the “peace party” in Japan would have been even more eager to end the war.

However, the enormous resistance (and prominence) of the “war party”—even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were bombed and the emperor had prepared a surrender statement—weakens this otherwise persuasive claim. A violent coup to stop the emperor’s surrender statement from being broadcast to the public was almost successful; a general was killed in cold blood and another committed ritual suicide. [2]

Now, I have arrived at my third topic: the Soviet Union. Continue reading “Stalin and the Last Days of World War II”

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“Unconditional Surrender” and the Atom Bomb  

Surrender of a Japanese Army in Thaton, Burma (now Myanmar). Licenses by Creative Commons.

The bombing of civilians in Ukraine and talk of tactical nuclear weapons puts us in mind of the original atom bomb, dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, on Aug. 6, 1945.

This is the second of my three posts attempting to think freshly about the factors that led Harry Truman to choose to detonate that devastating weapon. My first post dealt with Truman’s unfamiliarity with a job held by his predecessor for 16 years and his ignorance of the Manhattan Project.

This post will look at the role, if any, played by “unconditional surrender.”

A country that surrenders unconditionally cannot expect any rights (other than those required by international conventions) or for its government to continue. The victor calls the shots. There is no negotiation.

It has a strange (and troubling) history in World War II, especially with respect to Japan. Continue reading ““Unconditional Surrender” and the Atom Bomb  “